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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Congress, when it passed the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), found that “physical or mental 
disabilities in no way diminish a person’s right to fully 
participate in all aspects of society, yet many people with 
physical or mental disabilities have been precluded from doing 
so because of discrimination.”  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).  The 
remedy for this finding was “to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(b)(1).  But is it discrimination for an establishment, in 
the name of safety, to bar everyone who uses a psychiatric 
service animal, including someone who safely participated 
more than four score times without assistance?   
 
George Matheis, a retired police officer who has 
successfully managed a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress 
disorder (“PTSD”), routinely and safely donated plasma 
roughly 90 times in an 11-month period at CSL Plasma, Inc.’s 
plasma donation facility.  CSL barred him from making further 
donations when he brought his new service dog, Odin, to the 
facility the next time.  It reasoned that it has a policy to bar any 
individual who is prescribed daily more than two separate 
anxiety medications or who uses a service animal to manage 
anxiety.1  In its view, these people are categorically unsafe to 
donate plasma.  The company required Matheis to provide a 
                                              
1  The parties agree the two anxiety medications rule is not 
relevant to this appeal.   
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letter from his doctor stating he had no need for a service 
animal before it would screen him for further plasma donation.  
He sued, lost, and appeals to us. 
 
We have two issues.  We determine first whether plasma 
donation centers—facilities where members of the public have 
their plasma extracted in exchange for money—are subject to 
the ADA’s prohibition on unreasonable discrimination.  This 
turns on whether these facilities are “service establishments” 
under 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F), which has produced a circuit 
split between the Tenth and Fifth Circuits.  We conclude, like 
the District Court here, that the Tenth Circuit got it right: the 
ADA applies to plasma donation centers. 
   
So we next consider the question posed initially, 
whether CSL violated the ADA by imposing a blanket ban on 
prospective donors who use a psychiatric service animal.  Here 
we part with the District Court.  Public accommodations like 
CSL must permit disabled individuals to use service animals 
unless they can show a regulatory exception applies.  CSL has 
failed to provide evidence to satisfy the relevant exception 
here—that any safety rule “be based on actual risks and not on 
mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about 
individuals with disabilities.”  28 C.F.R. § 36.301(B).  Thus we 
reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand.   
I.  Factual Background 
CSL owns and operates a plasma donation facility in 
York, Pennsylvania.  Its business is collecting human blood 
plasma from the public and selling it to third parties.  It screens 
prospective donors for known health risks, extracts plasma 
from qualifying individuals, freezes it, and then ships it to 
manufacturing plants to be made into medicines.  The donation 
process is intense; each session lasts as long as two hours, and 
donors, who give blood as often as twice a week, must each 
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time pass an individualized screening process.  This process 
includes a check of the donor’s blood pressure and protein 
levels, along with questions to see how the donor is feeling and 
to check that he or she has not engaged in risky activities.  CSL 
pays its donors as much as several hundred dollars a month for 
their plasma.   
Matheis was involved in a deadly shooting incident 
while on duty as a SWAT officer with his police department in 
2000.  After that incident, he had problems socializing and was 
soon diagnosed with PTSD.  His condition sometimes causes 
him to suffer panic attacks when exposed to crowded or 
confined spaces, altercations, or helicopter noise.  He retired 
from the police force in 2007 to become a small business 
owner.  
  
In 2016, Matheis decided to donate plasma to raise extra 
money.  As noted, he did so approximately 90 times during that 
year at the CSL facility in York.  These went off without a 
hitch, and CSL paid Matheis between $250-300 a month for 
his donations.   
 
In October 2016, Matheis’s eldest daughter enlisted in 
the Navy.  Seeing the stress that her leaving caused her father, 
she bought him a dog, Odin, to help him cope with her absence.  
Odin was trained as a service dog for Matheis soon thereafter.   
 
During Odin’s initial training, Matheis brought him to 
CSL to introduce him to the facility.  Immediately on entering 
the building, his phlebotomist (someone trained to draw blood 
from patients or donors) told him he could not have a dog on 
the premises.  Matheis did not undergo CSL’s individualized 
assessment to determine if he could safely donate that day; 
instead his phlebotomist referred him to the CSL nurses’ 
station.  There he explained that Odin was a service animal that 
helped him manage his PTSD. The nurse referred him to a CSL 
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manger, who explained that, under its policies, CSL permitted 
service animals for the blind but not for anxiety.  Matheis again 
explained that Odin helped him manage his PTSD, a disability 
under the ADA.  After a phone call, the manager told him he 
could not donate.  Matheis offered to leave Odin in his car and 
donate without him.  The manager rejected this, stating he 
could not donate until he brought back a letter from his 
healthcare provider saying he could safely donate without 
Odin.  Matheis left CSL and has not returned to donate plasma 
since.   
CSL’s concern is not related to any health concerns that 
dogs like Odin pose; rather it has concluded that using a service 
animal for anxiety means that the donor’s condition is too 
severe to undergo safely the donation process.   
Matheis filed suit alleging discrimination for a failure to 
accommodate his condition.  To establish his claim, he must 
show that (1) he is disabled, (2) CSL is a “public 
accommodation” under Title III of the ADA, and (3) it 
unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of his 
disability by (a) failing to make a reasonable modification that 
was (b) necessary to accommodate his disability.  See PGA 
Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 683 n.38 (2001); Berardelli 
v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104, 123 (3d Cir. 
2018).   
CSL does not dispute that Matheis is disabled or that 
Odin is a trained service animal.  Thus this appeal hinges on 
the two issues noted above:  whether the ADA applies to CSL; 
and, if so, whether its conduct was unlawful discrimination 
under the ADA.  It moved for summary judgment contending 
that it was not subject to the ADA or, alternatively, that its 
policy—barring all individuals who use service animals for 
anxiety—was reasonable.  See Defendant’s Mot. for Summ. J. 
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at 12–19, Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00785-
SHR, 346 F. Supp. 3d 723, 734 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (ECF No. 27).   
The District Court ruled that the ADA covered CSL, but 
that the company did not unlawfully discriminate because it 
had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for refusing to 
allow Matheis to donate plasma, a concern that he had severe 
anxiety.  Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 3d 723, 
734 (M.D. Pa. 2018).  The Court buttressed what it recognized 
as a “necessary, yet counterintuitive,” conclusion, id. at 735, 
by stressing CSL would let Matheis donate with Odin once he 
cleared it with a doctor.  Id. at 737 (“CSL stated that it would 
admit Plaintiff if he provided it with a note from a psychologist 
stating that he could donate safely with Odin accompanying 
him.”) (emphasis added).  But CSL’s stance is that Matheis 
may not donate until he can safely donate without Odin. 
Matheis appeals the ruling, while CSL cross-appeals 
contending it is not subject to the ADA at all.   The Plasma 
Protein Therapeutics Association also filed an amicus brief and 
participated in oral argument, arguing that Title III of the ADA 
does not apply to plasma donation centers like CSL.  
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction per 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1343(a)(4).  Its grant of summary judgment was a 
final order, and so we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.   
We review de novo a grant of summary judgment.  
Metro Transp. Co. v. N. Star Reinsurance Co., 912 F.2d 672, 
678 (3d Cir. 1990).  We apply the same test the District Court 
would use.  Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 
2014).  Under this test, reviewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-mover, we grant summary judgment “if 
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the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
III.  Discussion 
A. Does the ADA apply to plasma donation centers? 
The ADA is divided into three titles of regulation—
Title I (employers), Title II (governments), and Title III (public 
accommodations).  Title III states that “[n]o individual shall be 
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and 
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 12182.  It reflects the 
ADA’s “comprehensive character,” Martin, 532 U.S. at 675 
(quotation omitted), and defines “public accommodation” to 
include, in relevant part:  
a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, 
beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, 
funeral parlor, gas station, office of an 
accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance 
office, professional office of a health care 
provider, hospital, or other service 
establishment; 
. . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (emphasis added).  Our focus narrows 
to whether a plasma donation facility is an “other service 
establishment.”   
This question has already produced a circuit split.  In 
Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., 828 F.3d 1227, 1229 
(10th Cir. 2016), a divided panel held that plasma donation 
centers were subject to the ADA as service establishments.  
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The Court relied on a broad, common definition of “service” 
and “establishment”—“conduct or performance that assists or 
benefits someone or something” and a “place of business,” 
respectively.  Id. at 1231 (quoting Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 778, 2075 (2002)).  It reasoned that 
giving the term “service establishment” the ordinary meaning 
of its components yielded neither ambiguity nor an irrational 
result.  Plasma donation centers “are ‘place[s] of business.’ . . . 
And they ‘assist[] or benefit[]’ those who wish to provide 
plasma for medical use—whether for altruistic reasons or for 
pecuniary gain—by supplying the trained personnel and 
medical equipment necessary to accomplish that goal.”  Id. at 
1234 (same) (alterations supplied in opinion).  
The Fifth Circuit in Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 907 
F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2018), viewed things differently.  It made 
two base observations—the donor is not benefited by donating, 
and each of the listed service establishments provides services 
to the public in exchange for money.  These features did not 
apply to plasma donation services.  Id. at 329.   
The dissent in Levorsen took a similar line.  It followed 
ejusdem generis, a canon of statutory interpretation that 
interprets a last, general term by looking to the preceding 
examples. From these the dissenting judge proposed the 
following definition: a service establishment “offer[s] the 
public a ‘service’ (1) in the form of (a) expertise (e.g., barbers, 
beauticians. . ., and hospitals) or (b) specialized equipment 
(e.g., laundromats and gas stations), (2) for use in achieving 
some desired end, (3) in exchange for monetary 
compensation.”  Levorsen, 828 F.3d at 1235 (Holmes, J., 
dissenting).  He concluded that plasma donation centers could 
not qualify as service establishments because donors do not 
pay money for the service and (confusingly) because the 
donation centers do not offer their services in order to benefit 
the public.   
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[T]o the extent that plasma-donation centers 
provide services to the public—such as those 
services identified by Mr. Levorsen and the 
United States—they do not do so for 
the public’s use in achieving a desired end; 
instead, they provide them for the centers’ use in 
achieving a desired end.  More specifically, 
plasma-donation centers provide the public with 
the expertise associated with blood [extraction] . 
. . so that the centers can sell the plasma to their 
customers in the pharmaceutical industry (i.e., 
the desired end)—not so that they can assist the 
public to achieve some desired end.  
Id. at 1243 (emphases in original). 
 We align with the majority in the Tenth Circuit.  First, 
at least here no support exists for the Fifth Circuit’s statement 
that donors “do not benefit” from the act of donating.  The 
record is unequivocal that Matheis and other donors receive 
money, a clear benefit, to donate plasma.   
Second, Judge Holmes’s attempt in his dissent to 
distinguish this benefit on the basis of the secondary profit 
motive of plasma facilities is unpersuasive.  A bank, one of the 
listed examples in § 12181(7)(F), is an obvious example of a 
service establishment that uses the fruits of its public-facing 
services for subsequent profit.  Not only does it provide the 
means and expertise to hold safely the public’s money, it also 
may provide interest or other benefits (including cash or 
rewards) to convince customers to entrust them with their 
savings.  That a bank subsequently invests, trades, or loans this 
money to third parties does not make it any less a service 
establishment with respect to the public.   
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Moreover, any emphasis on the direction of monetary 
compensation is, to us, unhelpful.  Businesses that offer 
services to the public convey something of economic value in 
return for something else of economic value.  The value 
received by the service provider and given by the customer is 
often money, but it need not be.  Money is one proxy for 
economic value, and economic value is fungible.   
The bank example shows we should not arbitrarily 
narrow the scope of “service establishments” to entities that 
receive compensation from customers in the form of money.  
Banks and their customers exchange sources of economic 
value that do not always fit into a simple “money for service” 
model.  As noted, customers often receive money from banks 
for using the bank’s service.  Banks are hardly the only 
example of companies that pay the public to use their services.  
Amicus Plasma Protein Therapeutics Association conceded at 
oral argument that a pawnshop is a service establishment under 
Title III.  It pays money in exchange for people’s possessions.  
So too, as the District Court noted, is a recycling center a 
service establishment; it compensates consumers in exchange 
for their waste and has been held subject to the ADA.  Matheis, 
346 F. Supp. 3d at 734 n.9 (citing Estrada v. S. St. Prop., LLC, 
No. 17-cv-259, 2017 WL 3461290, *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 
2017)).  These examples underscore a simple fact: providing 
services means providing something of economic value to the 
public; it does not matter whether it is paid for with money or 
something else of value.  
Hence we conclude that a plasma donation center is a 
service establishment under the ADA.  It offers a service to the 
public, the extracting of plasma for money, with the plasma 
then used by the center in its business of supplying a vital 
product to healthcare providers.  That both the center and 
members of the public derive economic value from the center’s 
provision and public’s use of a commercial service does not 
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divorce the center from the other listed examples in 
§ 12181(7)(F).  Indeed this is an irreducible feature of a market 
system.   
B. Did CSL discriminate against Matheis?  
We next turn to whether CSL violated the ADA when it 
barred Matheis from donating plasma.   
i. Legal standard 
The statute requires that public accommodations not 
discriminate on the basis of disability.  Discrimination 
includes: 
a failure to make reasonable modifications in 
policies, practices, or procedures, when such 
modifications are necessary to afford such 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations to individuals 
with disabilities, unless the entity can 
demonstrate that making such modifications 
would fundamentally alter the nature of such 
goods, services, [etc.]. 
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (emphases added).   
A company regulated under Title III may be held liable 
for failing to accommodate.  This is “a standard that turn[s] on 
(1) whether the requested accommodation to the program was 
‘reasonable’; (2) whether it was necessary ‘to assure 
meaningful access’; and (3) whether it would represent ‘a 
fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] 
program.’”  Berardelli, 900 F.3d at 115 (quoting Alexander v. 
Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)).  The plaintiff bears the initial 
burden of establishing that the desired accommodation is 
reasonable and necessary, while the defendant bears the burden 
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of showing that it would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
program.  Id. at 124; see J.D. by Doherty v. Colonial 
Williamsburg Found., 925 F.3d 663, 671 (4th Cir. 2019).   
CSL does not contend that permitting Odin to 
accompany Matheis would fundamentally alter the nature of its 
service.  Nor does it dispute Matheis’s evidence showing that 
Odin is a necessary accommodation (indeed, CSL’s policy 
assumes that Odin is a necessary accommodation and bars 
Matheis outright for it).  The only question is whether his use 
of Odin is reasonable.   
Title III entities are required by regulation to “modify 
policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a service 
animal by an individual with a disability.”  28 C.F.R. § 36.302.  
In other words, use of a service animal by a disabled individual 
“is reasonable under the ADA as a matter of law” so long as no 
Department of Justice-promulgated regulation supersedes this 
general rule.  Berardelli, 900 F.3d at 119 (vacating a jury 
verdict for a school district that denied one of its students with 
epilepsy use of her service dog).2  The service-animal 
regulations satisfy Matheis’s initial burden to show an 
accommodation is reasonable; CSL must establish that an 
exception to those regulations applies.  Id. at 124.  
This burden differs significantly from the test the 
District Court seems to have applied when it concluded CSL’s 
denial was not based on a “discriminatory animus.”  It 
borrowed the employment discrimination framework from 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  
                                              
2 Though Berardelli involved the reasonableness of service 
animals under the Title II regulations (Part 35), the approach 
here is identical, as those animal service regulations use 
“materially identical language” as the regulations under the 
Title III regulations (Part 36).  Id. at 118–19.   
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That framework involves burden shifting: a plaintiff must 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination; when he does, 
the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action against the 
employee.  If the employer does so, the employee may attempt 
to show the reason is a pretext to hide discrimination.  See, e.g., 
Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n. of Se. Pennsylvania, 168 F.3d 
661, 668 (3d Cir. 1999). 
Because a plaintiff need not show intentional 
discrimination to demonstrate a violation of Title III of the 
ADA, Lentini v. Calif. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 
837, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2004), we reject using McDonnell 
Douglas in this context, and instead follow the Berardelli 
framework for ADA claims against a public accommodation.  
Thus we must determine whether CSL has established 
exceptions that permit a plasma donation center to deny a 
disabled individual’s use of a service animal.  If none apply, 
Matheis’s use of Odin is a reasonable accommodation, and his 
claim succeeds.   
ii. Regulatory exceptions 
In Berardelli we concluded that a small group of 
regulatory exceptions, both within the animal service 
regulations and listed elsewhere in Part 35, formed the 
exclusive bases for a government entity to deny a service 
animal who is a necessary accommodation for a disabled 
person:  
[The regulations] specify the limited 
circumstances in which it would be unreasonable 
to require these actors to allow the use of service 
animals: if granting access would . . . pose a 
“direct threat” to the health or safety of 
others, id. §§ 35.139, 36.208, or if the animal is 
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either “out of control” or “not housebroken,”[] id. 
§§ 35.136(b)(1)–(2), 36.302(c)(2)(i)–(ii) . . . .  
Subject to these exceptions, however, the 
regulations mandate that “[i]ndividuals with 
disabilities shall be permitted to be accompanied 
by their service animals in all areas of [a covered 
actor’s facilities] where . . . program participants 
. . . are allowed to go.” Id. § 36.302(c)(7); see  
also id. § 35.136(g). 
 
Id. at 119.   
As the citations to Part 36 indicate, identical regulations 
exist for Title III entities.  None is relevant here.  The closest 
fit is 28 C.F.R. § 36.208, which permits public 
accommodations to deny anyone who poses a “direct threat” to 
others.  While CSL expresses concern that people like Matheis 
are a threat to staff and other donors, the “direct threat” 
exception requires “an individualized assessment” to 
determine “[t]he nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the 
probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and 
whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or 
procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids or services will 
mitigate the risk,” 28 C.F.R. § 36.208, an assessment CSL did 
not perform.   
That is not all that is relevant, however.  The parties and 
the District Court each note the eligibility regulation for Title 
III public accommodations, 28 U.S.C. § 36.301, and it 
ultimately controls our inquiry.  It states that “[a] public 
accommodation may impose legitimate safety requirements 
that are necessary for safe operation.  Safety requirements must 
be based on actual risks and not on mere speculation, 
stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with 
disabilities.”  28 U.S.C. § 36.301(b).  The parties agree CSL’s 
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policy deferring donors who use multiple anxiety medications 
or a service animal is a safety rule, so it must pass muster under 
§ 36.301(b).   
The parties and the District Court also note the blood 
transfusion regulation in 21 C.F.R. § 630.10, but this does not 
alleviate CSL’s burden under § 36.301(b).  It states a donor is 
ineligible if the donation “could adversely affect the health of 
th[at] donor,” 21 C.F.R. § 630.10(a), but the facility “must 
determine the donor’s eligibility” by the specified procedures 
for individualized assessment, 21 C.F.R. § 630.10(d).  The 
individualized assessment must check for 
factors that make the donor ineligible to donate. 
. . . Your assessment must include each of the 
following factors: 
(i) Symptoms of a recent or current illness; 
(ii) Certain medical treatments or 
medications; 
. . . . 
21 C.F.R. § 630.10(e)(2).  The regulation does not clarify 
which treatments are included among the “[c]ertain medical 
treatments.”   
CSL contends that it has complete discretion to 
determine what treatments, including use of service animals, 
show a donor may be harmed by donating.  This overreads the 
blood transfusion regulation.  It does not give plasma donation 
centers carte blanche to ignore U.S. law, which not only 
mandates that service animals be allowed, 28 C.F.R. 
§ 36.302(c), but also specifies when public accommodations 
may adopt rules that exclude disabled individuals in the name 
of safety, 28 C.F.R. 36.301.  Applied to our case, CSL may 
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consider a service animal among the list of “[c]ertain medical 
treatments” it can assess for eligible donating of plasma so long 
as it can show that the safety policy it adopts is based on “actual 
risk and not mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations 
about individuals with disabilities.”   
iii. Is CSL’s policy a valid safety rule? 
Though CSL bears the burden to show its service animal 
policy is valid under § 36.301(b), the evidence it marshals on 
its behalf is unimpressive and not remotely adequate to confer 
summary judgment.  It relies exclusively on a declaration from 
Dr. John Nelson, its divisional medical director, stating that 
“[d]onors with severe anxiety may be unable to follow 
directions, cause disturbances, impact the donation process . . 
.[,] putting staff at risk of getting stuck with the needle and 
other donors at risk of getting blood on them.”  J.A. at 89.  It 
also states that “[i]t is my professional medical opinion that 
donors with severe anxiety present serious health and safety 
risks to themselves, medical staff, and other donors.”  Id. at 90.  
The declaration’s lone statement addressing the use of a service 
animal is that   
CSL’s general policy is to defer a donor who 
requires more than two medications daily or a 
service animal for anxiety, until the need for 
medications or service animal decreases. . . . This 
policy is not directed to the use of a service dog, 
as CSL allows service dogs for vision-and 
hearing-impaired donors, but is based on the 
severity of the anxiety. 
Id.   
 These statements don’t get the job done.  Indeed, they 
seem clearly speculative and to generalize widely about 
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individuals who use psychiatric service animals, all of whom 
CSL apparently views as people with “severe anxiety.”  No 
medical justification or other scientific evidence undergirds 
CSL’s implicit conclusion that all those persons have “severe 
anxiety” and will put staff, other donors, or themselves at risk 
when donating plasma.  This conclusion is not even stated; Dr. 
Nelson does not connect the dots by attesting that using a 
service animal indicates “severe anxiety.”  This is clearly 
inadequate to show that CSL’s policy is based on actual risk 
and not based on speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations. 
 CSL’s main retort is that Matheis cannot now challenge 
Dr. Nelson’s declaration because he failed to challenge its 
reliability before the District Court under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702.  (CSL Br. at 31.)  Though Matheis did not move 
to exclude the declaration, this is not fatal; he argued before the 
District Court that the testimony fails to satisfy the safety rule 
regulation.  See Plaintiff’s Br. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for 
Summ. J. at 15–16, Matheis, No. 1:17-cv-00785-SHR, 346 F. 
Supp. 3d 723 (ECF No. 30).  He can press this issue on appeal, 
as he does, without challenging Dr. Nelson’s reliability as a 
witness.  (See Matheis Br. at 19, Reply at 8–9.) 
As a final Hail Mary, CSL argues it had other reasons 
for concluding Matheis had severe anxiety (which we assume 
for the sake of argument could support deferral for the reasons 
stated in the Nelson Declaration).  Discovery revealed that 
Matheis had a panic attack after he was deferred from CSL (he 
confronted a homeless man while leaving the facility) and that 
some of his past panic attacks have been accompanied by 
violent symptoms.  (See generally CSL Br. at 21–29.)  It asserts 
that these facts show it reasonably required him to seek a 
doctor’s signoff that he was safe to donate without Odin.   
While we disagree, we note a predicate problem as well.  
CSL raises this issue for the first time on appeal.  Before the 
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District Court it moved for summary judgment on two narrow 
grounds: (1) that CSL was not a public accommodation under 
Title III of the ADA; and (2) that its policy barring all anxiety 
patients who use a service animal to treat anxiety was a 
legitimate safety rule.  See Defendant’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 
12–19, Matheis, No. 1:17-cv-00785-SHR, 346 F. Supp. 3d 723 
(ECF No. 27).  We will not consider its new argument in favor 
of summary judgment.  See Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 
F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011) (“It is axiomatic that arguments 
asserted for the first time on appeal are deemed to be waived 
and consequently are not susceptible to review in this Court 
absent exceptional circumstances.”) (quotation omitted).3  As 
CSL’s two timely justifications for summary judgment fail, we 
reverse.   
IV. Conclusion 
CSL is a public accommodation under Title III of the 
ADA, and so it applies to CSL’s plasma donation center.  
Hence we affirm the District Court’s ruling on this issue. 
We reverse, however, its grant of summary judgment to 
CSL on whether it complied with the ADA.  In doing so, we 
do not suggest that CSL would be wrong in the future to require 
a doctor’s note stating Matheis may safely donate with Odin.  
Indeed, had CSL adopted such a stance from the start, we might 
agree with how the District Court ruled.  But CSL concedes 
that it will only consider Matheis as a potential donor when he 
provides a doctor’s note attesting he can safely donate without 
Odin.  CSL’s lone justification is its service animal policy, 
which it does not support with evidence showing that policy is 
                                              
3 To the extent CSL has attempted to justify Matheis’s deferral 
by pointing to his post-deferral panic attack that he experienced 
while leaving the donation facility, we do not see how an event 
that occurred after deferral could now be cited as a basis for it.   
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based on actual risk and not speculation, generalizations, or 
stereotypes.  Moreover, CSL fails to explain why Matheis, who 
has managed his PTSD for nearly two decades and safely 
donated plasma roughly 90 times, should only be considered 
safe to donate when he renounces the new service animal that 
helps him better manage his PTSD.    
Thus we reverse and remand the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment in favor of CSL.  On remand, the Court 
may determine whether to permit CSL to move for summary 
judgment on other grounds, to hold trial, or to conclude on the 
facts presented that CSL violated the ADA. 
